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As is well known one can establish under certain appropriate conditions a systematic relationship between the intensity of the reactions of an optimizing agent vis-a-vis parameter changes and the restrictiveness of the environment in which it operates. This phenomenon, the so-called strong 1 LeChStelier principle, is formally merely a property of bordered Hessians and a consequence of the fact that by subjecting an agent to additional 'just binding' constraints the curvature of the surface of its feasible set is being made progressively more concave at the chosen optimal point. Now, Edlefsen [3] has recently shown that essentially the same predicitions as under the LeChatelier principle follow if the increased concavity of the feasible' set's curvature at the extremum point is brought about by the replacement of a given constraint through another more concave one rather than by addition of further constraints. This type of problem may appear to be somewhat artificial at first sight but it arises naturally in the context of hedonic price functions, and as
Edlefsen demonstrated, its analysis leads to new and very interesting insights into the effects of nonlinearities in the constraints on certain aspects in the behaviour of households, for example.
As has already been indicated, and is also apparent from the type _ of proof Edlefsen uses, his approach is still very much in the LeChatelier tradition: the feasible set is varied systematically *This is a revised version of a short chapter in my thesis "Uber die Wirksamkeit der Preispolitik in Entwicklungslandern" (Konstanz, mimeo, October 1981) which relates the analysis there to the interesting new comparative statics phenomenon that was recently established by Edlefsen [3] .
whereas the objective function is held fixed. One may wonder whether the reverse, i.e. varying the objective function systematically while keeping the feasible set fixed, would not lead to a similar phenomenon -and indeed, it does. It is the purpose of this paper to briefly develop this idea. Section 1 sets out with a short description of the type of static optimization problems which are to be compared and goes on to prove the main result in two versions. In section 2, the stronger version will then be applied to a simple problem in the theory of the firm: Our aim there is to establish a systematic relationship between the price responsiveness of a producer and the conditions prevailing in its markets.
The Effects of Nonlinearities in the Objective Function on the Bordered Hessian
In what follows, we will compare the comparative statics of the two optimization problems Define the associated Lagrangeans
where X=(X 1 ,..,X )' and X=(X 1 ,..,X r > ' denote the respective Lagrange multipliers. Throughout it will be assumed that the two problems achieve a regular interior maximum for any given set of parameters,
i.e. we assume that at these extremum points x* and x*, the respective first and second order sufficient conditions hold. This allows us to conclude immediately that the associated bordered Hessians' at the point x* but that it.bends away from this tangent hyperplane more quickly than the latter. More precisely, we will investigate the effect of letting f(x,a) possess the same gradient as f(x,a) at the point x* but making it relatively concave. This is clearly the reverse analogue to the case covered by Edlefsen or the classical strong LeChatelier principle. The result then is:
(i) if the comparability condition
holds, problems (lj and (I 1 ) lead to the same decision, i.e.
x*=x*. Furthermore, X*=X*.
(ii) Given the comparability condition (5), if
holds, the difference H (x*,X*,ct)-H (x*,X*,a) will be negative semidefinite.
(iii) Given the comparability condition (5) (5) likewise (8'). Thus we conclude x*=x* and X*=X* which proves (i) and means in particular that the bordered Hessians as well as their inverses are to be evaluated at the same point (x*,X*,a) .
Note that accordingly H(x*,X*,a) can be expressed as (9) H(x*,X*,ct) = H(x*,X*,a) + S , where S has the. simple structure If also D is unconditionally negative semidefinite, then the entire RHS is non-positive. Thus, in view of (6), (ii) is proven. Let w=0 and reconsider (11) which then collapses, using again (4) and (4'), to read
The second term on the RHS is again clearly non-positive. In order .to establish the non-positivity of the entire RHS of (12) and thus to prove (iii), we must merely show that the n-vector h=Au occuring in the first term on the RHS has the property that is required in (7).
Now observe that when multiplying out the equation HH~ =1 in partitioned form using (3') and (4'), one of the resulting four equations is g A=0. Hence, g Au=0 holds which means that the vector X X -6 -h=Au indeed possesses the required property g h=0. This then establishes (iii) and completes the proof.
Condition (7) is clearly much weaker than condition (6) because it requires the relative concavity of f(x,a) to f(x,a) to hold only for those directions around x* that are feasible given the constraints while (6) requires this to hold for all directions. However, unless the problem under consideration is of an exceedingly simple structure, the validity of condition (7) will in general be rather difficult to check if (6) is violated.
An Application to the Theory of the Firm
It should be evident that Edlefsen's analysis of the household choosing between quantity and quality [3, section 5] when facing parametric or hedonic prices can be directly replicated by considering this household if it were to minimize expenditures given a certain prescribed utility level and using (iii) above. On this basis one could likewise easily show that the compensated demand of a household which is entitled to progressive rebates on its consumer goods purchases will be more sensitive to a change in a-conjugate parameter such as an indirect tax or a subsidy on a commodity than if it got no rebates.
However, in order to investigate a problem which cannot be solved that easily with Edlefsen's approach we will analyze here in some more detail the comparative static reactions of two producers who are .
exposed to identical technological as well as other constraints but face different market conditions. It is a well known fact that e.g. a profit maximizing monopolist will react qualitatively much the same way to a price change in a competitive factor market as a producer facing competitive conditions in his output market. But while the direction of these reactions to such price changes are identical, the intensity will in general differ. As a matter of fact, it can be shown -7 -under fairly reasonable assumptions that the monopolist will respond less intensely to a price change in a factor market than a perfect competitor. One might be inclined to think that it is essentially the elasticity of demand or supply in the various relevant output or input markets which determines the intensity of the response. This is, however, not correct for it is the the speed with which marginal revenue or marginal expenditure in the various markets changes rather than the size of the demand or supply elasticities in these markets which is responsible for a more or less intense reaction to a change in a conjugate parameter. To put it more precisely and generally, we intend to show that the more rapidly marginal revenue declines or marginal expenditure rises in at least one output or input market the less intensely a profit maximizing producer tends to react in any market to a change in prices, indirect taxes, shifts in demand or supply or any other conjugate parameter. This finding will allow us to portray the general demand and supply behaviour of a producer with monopolistic or monopsonistic power in a certain market j as being bracketed between two extremes, namely the behaviour under perfect competition and the behaviour under quantity rationing in market j.
Letting x=(x.,..,x )' denote quantities, we will use the common convention to speak of an output or an input i according to whether the associated quantity x. is positive or negative, respectively. Let p., the (positive) price prevailing in market i, be a function of x. 3 Letting the prices pj_ be functions of Xj_ alone rather than of the entire vector x precludes the possibility to allow for interconnected markets and appears therefore to be unwarranted. However, dropping this assumption would substantially complicate the comparative static analysis below and lead to results that appear to resist a useful economic interpretation. This will become more apparent when viewing (14), (15) and (16) below and considering that without this assumption the relevant matrices z and 3'z would cease to be diaqonal. which says that both producers will make the same decision and face identical shadow prices. And since (16) is in turn equivalent to condition (6), we conclude furthermore on the basis of (ii) above that -1 "-1 -the difference H (x*,X*,B,y)" H (x*,X*,B,y) and consequently in particular .
- (18) A-A and C-C are negative semidefinite Using (14), (14'), (15) and (17) we havex*-x* = (A-A)z (x*) and -* * B B x X -X = C-C which in view of (18) implies in particular 4 4 Note that 3x*/3g. = -a..3z X (x*)/3x. where a., denotes the i-th diagonal element of A which must be negative semidefinite. The reaction 3x*/3B. has therefore the same sign as 3z /3x.. Since that applies also for the reaction 3x*/3B., both reactions will consequently have the same sign and differ merely in magnitude. Let the price of an output i rise. This is clearly for both producers an incentive to expand production of output i. But the incentive for the second producer will erode more quickly since in the process of expanding output the use of factor j will normally 5 also expand and thus become more expensive while for the first producer its price stays the same. Let us stick to this simple setup one more moment.
When starting from perfectly competitive conditions in factor market j and allowing these market conditions to become increasingly more 'monopsonistic' so that the second derivative of the expenditure function z (x.) goes from first zero to (minus) infinity, one may establish on the basis of (ii) a chain of increasingly weaker reactions 3x./3B. (i=l,..,n) the end of which simulates the situation of quantity Alternatively, let factor j be inferior with respect to output i in the sense that demand for that factor falls when the price of output i rises (compare Bear [l] or Ferguson [5] for a symmetric but slightly different definition of an inferior input). In this case the marginal expenditure saved because of the reduction in demand for that factor is absolutely smaller for the second producer which again leads to the conclusion that his output expansion will be comparatively less pronounced.
-11 -rationing in factor market j. It is in this sense that the demand and supply behaviour of an ordinary monopsonist in factor market j or, more precisely, his immediate reactions 3x*/33. (i=l,..,n) can be considered to be bracketed between those of a comparable producer facing perfect competition in market j on the one hand and those of a producer facing quantity rationing in this market on the other. -12 -analysis of a household choosing between quantity and quality when facing hedonic prices, and served here furthermore in an application to the theory of the firm where it was demonstrated that a systematic relationship exists between the intensity of the reactions of a producer to changes in a conjugate parameter and the conditions prevailing in his markets.
